Non residents can claim exemption from Aadhaar-based verification

first_imgAs per the Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial and Other Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016, every ‘resident’ is entitled to get an Aadhaar number by submitting demographic and biometric details. A resident for this purpose has also been defined in the Aadhaar Act itself. Such a ‘resident’ is an individual who has resided in India for a total of 182 days or more in the 12 months immediately preceding the date of application for enrolment in Aadhaar. Therefore, it is unlikely that you meet this criterion for Aadhaar enrolment.Read it at Live Mint Related Itemslast_img read more

US advisers sign off on plan for reviewing risky virus studies

first_imgA board of advisers this week signed off on a proposal for how the U.S. government should go about deciding whether to fund certain studies that could potentially create dangerous human pathogens. The plan now goes to government officials, who say they hope to put out a policy by the end of year. Still unclear, however, is exactly when they will lift an 19-month-old ban that has halted a handful of virology studies.The report from the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) is meant to guide decisions about so-called gain-of-function (GOF) studies—experiments that modify a pathogen in ways that could make it more transmissible and more pathogenic in humans. Such studies can help experts prepare for pandemics, but they also pose risks if the altered pathogen should escape the lab. In 2011, two GOF studies with the deadly H5N1 avian influenza virus sparked a lengthy NSABB discussion over whether the work should even be published. (Ultimately, the NSABB said it should be.) The studies also led to a new oversight policy for certain H5N1 experiments.Then in 2014, more papers on risky flu viruses, along with some mishaps at federal labs, convinced U.S. officials that existing policies weren’t enough. In October 2014, the White House announced a “pause” on new funding for 18 GOF studies of influenza, SARS, and MERS viruses (although several projects were later exempted). Officials then asked a revived NSABB to come up with a process for overseeing risky GOF studies. Click to view the privacy policy. Required fields are indicated by an asterisk (*) Email Like the previous draft, the new plan lays out a process for reviewing studies: The investigator and his or her institution will determine if a proposed study is potentially GOFROC. If it passes peer review, the funding department—such as the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)—will then evaluate the experiment using eight criteria. For example, it will look at whether the investigators’ lab has sufficient safety measures in place and the benefits outweigh the risks to society.The final report also calls for creating a new federal advisory board (something like the NSABB) to publicly review GOFROC policies (but not specific experiments). It suggests GOFROC oversight should extend to privately funded studies, which now are not reviewed by government bodies unless they involve regulated pathogens. And it urges officials to create a system for tracking lab accidents—a suggestion other experts have made. In their meeting, advisers also recommended a system for sharing the experiences of institutional review boards with GOFROC proposals.The report has new wording that is apparently aimed at critics who have argued that the HHS should not review studies it funds, because that would represent a conflict of interest. The report says the HHS review “should be structured to avoid real or apparent conflicts of interest,” but doesn’t specify how that can be done. Harvard University epidemiologist Marc Lipsitch, one of the critics, says the review group should “have wide representation from well beyond the agencies with vested interest.”The new review process should ensure that risky GOF research is evaluated early, before it is funded, said NSABB chair Samuel Stanley of Stony Brook University in New York. “We can start to avoid situations where [GOFROC] is only first identified at the publication stage,” as happened with the H5N1 papers, he said.How hard to implement?Agencies shouldn’t have trouble implementing the GOFROC policy because it’s similar to the review process for so-called Dual Use Research of Concern, an overlapping category of studies on agents potentially used as bioweapons, said Dennis Dixon of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases in Bethesda, Maryland, which funds GOF research. “We’ve done it before,” Dixon said.Implementation will require “from light to heavy lifts,” Gerald Epstein of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy told the NSABB. For example, although  HHS can easily set up new review processes, new rules for university investigators receiving federal grants may have to go through a formal rulemaking process. And oversight of nonfederally funded may require action by Congress. But Epstein promised to “get something done” in the next few months that will “supersede the existing funding pause … It is certainly something I don’t think anybody wants to permit to go into the next administration,” he said.Stanley urged officials to “move as quickly as possible.” The pause may have only stopped a few studies, he said, but he’s worried that is has “had a broader effect on the infectious disease research community” by creating “uncertainty” that has convinced some young scientists to “rethink careers in certain areas.” Sign up for our daily newsletter Get more great content like this delivered right to you! Country New process recommendedNow, after six meetings, two National Academy of Sciences workshops, and a 1000-page risk assessment by a contractor, the NSABB on 24 May approved a final proposal. Their latest report is similar to an earlier draft that found that only a “small subset” of studies are of concern. But this time, the board provides examples—for instance, GOF studies to develop seasonal flu vaccines are not worrisome. The board has also modified its definition of what it now calls Gain of Function Research of Concern (GOFROC). An earlier definition, for instance, covered experiments that generated a pathogen that is highly transmissible, highly virulent, and “resistant to public health control measures.” The new definition, however, drops the “resistant” wording, because not all nations might be able to deploy antiviral drugs or other countermeasures. Country * Afghanistan Aland Islands Albania Algeria Andorra Angola Anguilla Antarctica Antigua and Barbuda Argentina Armenia Aruba Australia Austria Azerbaijan Bahamas Bahrain Bangladesh Barbados Belarus Belgium Belize Benin Bermuda Bhutan Bolivia, Plurinational State of Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba Bosnia and Herzegovina Botswana Bouvet Island Brazil British Indian Ocean Territory Brunei Darussalam Bulgaria Burkina Faso Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Canada Cape Verde Cayman Islands Central African Republic Chad Chile China Christmas Island Cocos (Keeling) Islands Colombia Comoros Congo Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Cook Islands Costa Rica Cote d’Ivoire Croatia Cuba Curaçao Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark Djibouti Dominica Dominican Republic Ecuador Egypt El Salvador Equatorial Guinea Eritrea Estonia Ethiopia Falkland Islands (Malvinas) Faroe Islands Fiji Finland France French Guiana French Polynesia French Southern Territories Gabon Gambia Georgia Germany Ghana Gibraltar Greece Greenland Grenada Guadeloupe Guatemala Guernsey Guinea Guinea-Bissau Guyana Haiti Heard Island and McDonald Islands Holy See (Vatican City State) Honduras Hungary Iceland India Indonesia Iran, Islamic Republic of Iraq Ireland Isle of Man Israel Italy Jamaica Japan Jersey Jordan Kazakhstan Kenya Kiribati Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Republic of Kuwait Kyrgyzstan Lao People’s Democratic Republic Latvia Lebanon Lesotho Liberia Libyan Arab Jamahiriya Liechtenstein Lithuania Luxembourg Macao Macedonia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Maldives Mali Malta Martinique Mauritania Mauritius Mayotte Mexico Moldova, Republic of Monaco Mongolia Montenegro Montserrat Morocco Mozambique Myanmar Namibia Nauru Nepal Netherlands New Caledonia New Zealand Nicaragua Niger Nigeria Niue Norfolk Island Norway Oman Pakistan Palestine Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay Peru Philippines Pitcairn Poland Portugal Qatar Reunion Romania Russian Federation Rwanda Saint Barthélemy Saint Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha Saint Kitts and Nevis Saint Lucia Saint Martin (French part) Saint Pierre and Miquelon Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Samoa San Marino Sao Tome and Principe Saudi Arabia Senegal Serbia Seychelles Sierra Leone Singapore Sint Maarten (Dutch part) Slovakia Slovenia Solomon Islands Somalia South Africa South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands South Sudan Spain Sri Lanka Sudan Suriname Svalbard and Jan Mayen Swaziland Sweden Switzerland Syrian Arab Republic Taiwan Tajikistan Tanzania, United Republic of Thailand Timor-Leste Togo Tokelau Tonga Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia Turkey Turkmenistan Turks and Caicos Islands Tuvalu Uganda Ukraine United Arab Emirates United Kingdom United States Uruguay Uzbekistan Vanuatu Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of Vietnam Virgin Islands, British Wallis and Futuna Western Sahara Yemen Zambia Zimbabwelast_img read more